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CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
SINCE UPJOHN, AT HOME AND ABROAD
Stanley A. Freedman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is hard to think of a subject that touches more closely the funca counselor-at-law than the privilege against disclosure that atof
tion
taches to his or her communications with clients, whether individual or

corporate.' The history of corporate attorney-client privilege over the
last twenty years, however, is a tale of long and steady attrition resulting from attempts to theorize the privilege into an attenuated vestige of
its once commanding power. One recalls with nostalgia that the privi2
lege once operated as a virtually impregnable bar to disclosure.
Since those halcyon days, nice distinctions have proliferated in the
never-ending efforts of prosecutors to make defendants' lawyers do
their work for them and of adversaries to mine rich new veins of discovery. What they seek is not, of course, the facts, for the facts are
always discoverable. 3 They seek instead to color their cases by compelling the disclosure of lawyers' views, impressions, and attitudes, privately expressed, that may be teased into admissions damaging to the
client or embarrassing to the client's cause.' These efforts to force disclosure of purportedly privileged communications have spawned many
* Member of the firm of Smith & Schnacke, a legal professional association, Dayton, Ohio.
A.B., Harvard University (1943); .D., Harvard University (1949). This article has been adapted
from a speech given by the author in conjunction with the 103d Annual Meeting and Convention
of the Ohio State Bar Association, before the Antitrust Law Section. The assistance of Lynda
Myska Irvine, Esq., is gratefully acknowledged.
1. This article speaks primarily to the attorney-client privilege, not to the protection afforded the attorney's work product, although there is necessarily some overlap, both in the authorities cited and in the considerations giving rise to the doctrines.
2. The author remembers, years ago, hearing counsel try to persuade Judge Weinman, then
sitting on the federal bench in Dayton, to parse a lawyer's letter in order to separate privileged
from unprivileged matter. The judge cut off the argument as soon as he caught its drift: A lawyer's letter was absolutely and ipsofacto beyond the reach of discovery, and there was no point in
wasting breath on it.
3. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).
4. Those efforts have not been free from judicial criticism. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676
F.2d 793, 817 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[S]ociety's interest in ferreting out the truth through
litigation will not best be served by exposing a party's case to impeachment by documents reflecting the opinions or preliminary evaluations of its counsel, even if the party's position in court is
inconsistent with counsel's private thoughts."). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516
(1947) (Murphy, J., concurring), quoted in Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396 ("Discovery was hardly
intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions . . . on wits borrowed from the
adversary.").
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ingenious theories 5 and the courts in turn developed several tests for
determining the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege. 6
A majority of the courts had favored the "control-group" test7 until the Supreme Court rejected it in Upjohn Co. v. United States;' a
substantial minority of the courts have utilized the subject-matter test
as articulated by the court in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Deck-

er;9 and other courts have used variations of the subject-matter test."0

5. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 658
F.2d 1355, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (court of appeals reversed district court which had accepted
the contention, much favored by antitrust prosecutors, that a lawyer cannot represent a corporation and an employee of the corporation at the same time), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982);
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (no corporate privilege in stockholder's
action against corporation and officers), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.) (attorney communications are protected
only when made to or by the authorized or elite among corporate decisionmakers, thereby exposing to the adversary all other attorney communications with corporate employees-the "controlgroup" test), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950) (rejected the suggestion that in-house counsel stand on a different footing vis-i-vis privilege than outside counsel).
6. Essentially four tests were created and applied by the courts: (1) the control-group test,
(2) the subject-matter test, (3) the modified subject-matter test, and (4) the test utilized by the
court in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1978). See The AttorneyClient Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. LiGATION 32-41 [hereinafter cited as 1983 A.B.A.]; 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 480 (1980); 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1981); 81
MICH. L. REV. 665 (1983); 69 MIcH. L. REV. 360 (1970).
7. [I1f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a
position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which
the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member
of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.
Westinghouse, 210 F. Supp. at 485.
8. 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).
9. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently
identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is
privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in
the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by
the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee of
the duties of his employment.
423 F.2d at 491-92.
10. Under the modified subject-matter test,
the attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making
the communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made
the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the
communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure
need to know its contents.
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on reh g en banc,
572 F.2d 606, 609 (1978).
The Ampicillin Antitrust court concluded that the privilege applied if the following require-

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/4

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

1984]

Twenty years of nice distinctions came to a new point of departure in
the celebrated Upjohn case.
Upjohn placed all of these tests in limbo. 1 The Sixth Circuit in
that case had applied the then-fashionable "control-group" test and
concluded that the reporting managers, not being responsible for directing Upjohn's actions in respect to legal advice, were not clients, and
therefore their communications were not privileged." The Supreme
Court reversed,' 3 in an opinion important not only for its rejection of
the control-group test 1" but also for its reaffirmation of the interests
served by the privilege.
The Court noted that the purpose of the privilege is to promote
"full and frank communications" with the attorney, which are neces5
sary if the attorney is to give sound, informed legal advice.' The privilege also promotes broader public ends thereby-interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice. The Court recognized

ments were met:
I) The particular employee or representative of the corporation must have made a
communication of information which was reasonably believed to be necessary to the deci-

sion-making process concerning a problem on which legal advice was sought;
2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of securing legal advice;
3) The subject matter of the communication to or from an employee must have been
related to the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment; and
4) The communication must have been a confidential one ....
81 F.R.D. at 385 (footnote omitted).
i. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In that case, the Internal Revenue Service sought to subpoena
answers to questionnaires obtained by the corporation's in-house general counsel from a number of
corporate managers relating to questionable payments made to officials of foreign governments.
Id. at 387-88.
The Upjohn decision has been the subject of extensive commentary. See Free, It's Not Who

You Are But What You Know: Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Expanded, 52 OKLA. B.J.
701 (1981); Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: Cases Applying Upjohn, Waiver,
Crime-Fraud Exception, and Related Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 1653 (1983); Nath, Upjohn: A New
Prescription for the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Defenses in Administrative Investigations, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 11 (1981); Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1982); Stern, Attorney-Client Privilege:
Supreme Court Repudiates the Control Group Test, 67 A.B.A. J. 1142 (1981); II CAP. U.L.
REV. 611 (1982); 1981 DET. C.L. REV. 1163; 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1182 (1982); 18 IDAHO L.
REV. 215 (1982); 67 IOWA L. REV. 161 (1981); 65 MARQ. L. REV. 241 (1981); 33 MERCER L.

671 (1982); 81 MICH. L. REV. 665 (1983); 2 Miss. C.L. REV. 391 (1982); 51 Miss. L.J. 613
(1980-81); 47 Mo. L. REV. 112 (1982); 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 925 (1982); 56 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 887 (1981); 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 409 (1981); 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1056 (1981); 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1043 (1980); 48 TENN. L. REV. 1024 (1981); 57 TUL. L. REV. 165 (1982); 50 U.
CIN. L. REV. 451 (1981); 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 195 (1981); 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 141 (1981); 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1577 (1982).
12. 449 U.S. at 390.
REV.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 402.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 389.
Id.
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the special need for the privilege in the corporate context in light of the
"vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation" and
the consequent constant need for legal advice.' 7 If these purposes of the privilege
are to be served, the "attorney and client must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected."' 8 But the vagaries of the control-group test made the game too
chancy to be relied upon.' 9 Noting the dilemma, the Court declined,
however, to lay down any alternative test or rule. 0
The limited scope of the holding in Upjohn, notwithstanding its
explication and vindication of the principles underlying corporate attorney-client privilege, has left a number of troublesome issues in its wake
for case by case resolution. This article addresses several of these problem areas-corporate attorney communications with former employees;
multiple parties having a joint interest; the distinction between legal
and business advice; waiver of the privilege by disclosure of the communications; the crime or fraud exception to the privilege; and the exclusive application of the privilege to communications with members of
the bar. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the extent of
the privilege in the European Economic Community, with particular
reference to applicability of the EEC rule to American lawyers advising clients engaged in business in the EEC.

17. Id. at 392-93.
18. Id. at 393. Legal advice "'can only be safely and readily availed of when free from
the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.'" Id. at 389 (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn,
128
U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
19. 449 U.S. at 393.
20. Id. at 396. Justice Rehnquist declined to adopt any of the other tests utilized
by the
various circuits because the Court sits "to decide concrete cases and not abstract propositions
of
law." Id. at 386. The Chief Justice, concurring in the judgment, disagreed with the Cburt's
diffidence, and articulated a standard to guide corporations, corporate counsels, and the federal
courts:
[A] communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or former employee
speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed
conduct within the scope of employment. The attorney must be one authorized by the management to inquire into the subject and must be seeking information to assist counsel
in
performing any of the following functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct
has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any,
of
that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been
or
may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.
Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Although the Chief Justice's effort to articulate
a specific
rule is commendable, the majority's case by case approach is more consistent with the
legislative
history of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Id. at 396. As Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion
noted, the Senate stated, in its report on the rule, that "'the recognition of a privilege based
on a
confidential relationship . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis.'" Id. at 396
(quoting
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS
7051).
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II.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DOES THE PRIVILEGE EXTEND TO CORPORATE COUNSEL'S
COMMUNICATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES?

In Upjohn Co. v. United States, seven former employees talked to
Upjohn's counsel regarding improper payments made while they were
still employed. The Court declined to decide whether those disclosures
1
were privileged because the question had not been addressed below.
The Ninth Circuit, however, seems to have taken up the question in In
re CoordinatedPretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust
Litigation.22 The court had there found that the privilege attached to
communications with former employees, stating ttat the rationale of
23
Upjohn applied to ex-employees as well as current ones. The reason
given for that holding was not happily phrased:
Former employees, as well as current employees, may possess the relevant information needed by corporate counsel to advise the client with
respect to actual or potential difficulties. Again, the attorney-client privilege is served by the certainty that conversations between the attorney
and client will remain privileged after the employee leaves. Although no
findings were made, it is clear that at least some of the conversations
referred to by the district court were made to counsel for the companies
in order to secure legal advice for the company. The orientation sessions
undoubtedly provided information which will be used by corporate2 counsel in advising the companies how to handle the pending lawsuit. '
The court failed to differentiate between communications made
while the witness is still an employee (a clear case) and communications made after the witness has left the corporation-two altogether
different situations. No doubt protection in the latter case may help
corporate counsel carry out the task of giving legal advice and assuring
corporate compliance with the law, but, from the point of view of the
privilege, talking to an ex-employee is no different than talking to any

21. 449 U.S. 383, 394 n.3 (1981). However, the Chief Justice clearly would have extended
the privilege to these former employees. Id. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
22. 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982). The district court
granted the plaintiff's motion (prior to Upjohn) to prevent counsel for the defendant corporation
from representing present and former employees in deposition. Id. at 1356. The district court
thought the plaintiffs were entitled to examine the witnesses as to how they had been prepared to
testify and that this would be possible only if there were no personal attorney-client relationship
between the witnesses and defense counsel. Id. at 1359. On appeal, the defendants argued under
Upjohn that the communications would be protected by the corporate attorney-client privilege
whether or not there was such a personal relationship. Id. at 1360. The court agreed. Id. at 1361.
23. Id. at 1361 n.7. See also United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 258-59 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (a post-Upjohn case applying the privilege to a former employee). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 374 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (a pre-Upjohn case
disallowing the privilege to former employees).
24. Petroleum Prods., 658 F.2d at 1361 n.7 (citation omitted).

Published by eCommons, 1983

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

9:3

third party who has useful knowledge of the facts. The Petroleum
Products opinion does not address this point. 25
III.

MULTIPLE PARTIES HAVING A JOINT INTEREST

Another important question left unanswered by Upjohn is the extent to which communications among multiple parties and their respective attorneys are protected, not only in the litigation setting, where the
rule is well established, but also in situations where litigation is neither
imminent nor anticipated 6 In a pre-Upjohn Federal Civil Rule 3727
case, SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,"8 Xerox had resisted discovery de-

25.

Id.
The court of appeals's conclusion is correct because the interests served by the corporation's attorney-client privilege are more important than the former employee's contractual independence from the corporation. A former employee may have the best--or even
the only-living memory of what the corporation thought and did during the disputed
events. The confidence guarded by the privilege facilitates a free and full exchange of information and advice between attorney and client. A company, which operates through
human actors, cannot maintain this confidence unless the privilege encompasses all employees involved in the transaction being litigated, including former employees.
Richardson, Former Employees as Witnesses, LITIGATION, Summer, 1983, at 35, 35. This commentator notes that the extension of the privilege to former employees of course involves a risk
that the corporation's attorney will color the witnesses' testimony, but the risk is no greater than it
is for current employees. Id.
One recent decision appears to go even further by extending the privilege to communications
with third parties if the information was being sought in order to formulate legal advice. In re
LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In dicta that court stated:
[An attorney can be asked directly about the substance of unprivileged communications
received from third parties and cannot resist disclosure on grounds that such information
was later conveyed to the client unless, of course, this information was obtained by the
attorney as part of an investigation necessary to give legal advice. . . .[T]he focal point
is the purpose of the lawyer in gathering the data.
Id. at 603 (emphasis added). Unless the court is here referring to work product, it would seem to
be expanding Upjohn and attorney-client privilege to protect unprivileged matters.
26. In proposed FED. R. EvID. 503(b)(3), which was never adopted, it was suggested that
[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client . . .(3) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing
another in a matter of common interest ....
56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972). On the other hand, proposed FED. R. EviD. 503(d)(5) provides:
There is no privilege under this rule:
(5) As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two or
more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between any of the clients.
56 F.R.D. at 236-37. For other materials discussing this issue, see 1983 A.B.A., supra note 6, at
19-22; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[06] (1982); 8 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 179 (1972); 63 YALE L.J. 1030 (1954).
27. Rule 37 permits courts to compel responses to questions posed in interrogatories and
depositions.
28. 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976).
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mands on the grounds of attorney-client privilege. 29 The court accepted

the proposition that legal consultations between corporations with common interests were entitled to protection even where litigation was not
involved.3 0 According to the court, "Corporations should be encouraged
to seek legal advice in planning their affairs to avoid litigation as well
as in pursuing it."'" However, the court found no privilege where Xerox
had disclosed its attorney's antitrust advice to its joint-venture partner
liability. They were
where there was no shared exposure to antitrust
32
merely two parties dealing at arm's length.

However, the "requisite common interest" for the privilege was
found to exist in the case of legal discussions respecting the xerography
patent structure between Xerox and its licensor. According to the
court, legal advice focused on developing a patent program that would

afford maximum protection in the companies' common interest deserved protection."
Another case involving multiple parties with a common interest is
In re LTV Securities Litigation.3 4 In this case, the SEC had investi-

gated LTV and its auditors.35 In the course of preparing a defense
strategy, LTV's counsel had conferred with representatives of the audi-

tors.38 The court applied the joint-defense privilege to protect what was
discussed in the common interest of the parties; 7 the possibility of future controversy between LTV and the auditors did not destroy this

29.
30.
31.

70 F.R.D. at 512.
Id. at 513.
id.

32. Id. at 512-13. This disclosure occurred in the context of a proposed sale of the partner's
interest to Xerox. Id.
33. Id. at 514. The court also found the privilege applicable to communications about legal
advice between executives who share "responsibility for the subject matter underlying the consultation" for similar reasons. Id. at 518. See Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp.,
62 F.R.D. 454, 456 (N.D. Ill. 1974), affd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 193 F. Supp. 251, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
34. 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In a shareholders' securities fraud class action, the
class challenged the alleged overvaluation of the inventories of LTV's subsidiary, Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., which resulted in a restatement of earnings by LTV. Id. at 598.
35. Id. at 598-99.
36. Id. at 599.
37. Id. at 604. The joint-defense privilege is an "exception to the general rule that no privilege attaches to communications made in the presence of third parties," which becomes applicable
when the privileged information is disclosed to "actual or potential co-defendants, or to their counld.
See also Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
I..."
sel, in the course of a joint defense .
Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (codefendant of former client); Hunydee v.
United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965) (joint conference and pooled information); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964) (inter-attorney exchanges); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (joint
conference); 50 FORDHAm L. REV. 963 (1982); 58 TEX. L. REV. 809 (1980); 35 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 321 (1981).
Published
by eCommons, 1983
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privilege.3 8
The more difficult question in that case involved the privilege
claimed for the results of an investigation by a lawyer appointed as
special officer pursuant to a consent decree that LTV had entered into
with the SEC.3 9 The SEC was privy to the special officer's report.4 0
The court thought that the privilege clearly would have applied if he
had been employed only by LTV. 4" Likewise, his work would have re-

mained confidential if he had been employed by the SEC since its disclosure might have impeded the SEC's enforcement proceedings."'
The court was, however, faced with the issue whether the privilege
should apply where the special officer occupied a dual position, both of
his undertakings entitled on principle to confidentiality, but neither permitting disclosure to another party without waiver of the privilege.43

The court reasoned by analogy that since "[t]he investigation is a joint
enterprise of LTV and the SEC, [it was] not unlike the joint defense

otherwise recognized by the cases.""" Therefore, the court rejected the
plaintiffs contention that the special officer's report must fit squarely
within either the attorney-client privilege or the work-product rule to
defeat discovery.4 6 Noting that the privilege must be flexible enough to
extend to newly created interests,46 such as that represented by the role

of the special officer, the court applied the privilege. 47

38. 89 F.R.D. at 604-05. "Even should such allies later become estranged, they would arguably still be entitled jointly to invoke the attorney-client privilege to protect shared confidences
from disclosure at the behest of a third party." Id. See also Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp.
at 386.
39. 89 F.R.D. at 614. The special officer was charged with investigating the facts and reporting to LTV's audit committee which, in turn, would recommend corrective action to the
board. Id.
40. Id. at 614-15.
41. Id. at 615. The court also stated that the work-product rule of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)
would serve to protect these communications. Id. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
397-402 (1981); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd in
part on reh'g en banc, 572 F.2d 606 (1978).
42. 89 F.R.D. at 618; see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978);
OKC Corp. v. Williams, 489 F. Supp. 576, 584 (N.D. Tex.), af'd, 614 F.2d 58 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980).
43. 89 F.R.D. at 618.
44. Id. at 621.
45. Id.
46. Id. "[A]s an evolving society engenders new relationships, courts must consider whether
interests are created that require some form of protection." Id. See also Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). In Trammel, the Court noted that "[i]n rejecting the proposed
Rules and enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law
of privilege. Its purpose rather was to 'provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of
privilege on a case-by-case basis,' and to leave the door open to change." Id. (citation omitted)
(quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)). See also S. REP. No.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051.
47. 89 F.R.D. at 621-22. Besides, in the exercise of its equity powers, the court thought
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In extending the privilege to encompass the work of the special
officer, the court noted that while its holding drew from the doctrines of
attorney-client privilege and work product, it applied neither. This "hybrid" privilege was justified because it protected from disclosure only
that which was revealed to the special officer as a result of his investigation for the SEC and LTV. Furthermore, such protection furthered
societal interests in "private dispute resolution" and ready access to
"normative guidance" from attorneys.48
IV.

LEGAL VERSUS BUSINESS ADVICE

Corporate clients enmeshed in the business of day-to-day compliance with the antitrust laws and other regulatory legislation must continually seek the advice of legal counsel. In the corporate context, this
legal advice is often inextricably interwoven with business advice. Yet
business advice is not within the attorney-client privilege.4 9 However,
while pure business advice is clearly not protected, the privilege "is not
lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly
stated in a communication which also includes legal advice." 50
The principle is easily stated. Its application makes for hard cases.
FederalSavings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Fieldingt1 is a good example of a case where the distinction between legal and business advice
was blurred. The district court in that case denied a motion to suppress
client files"' because the attorney and client had become business part-

that it ought to protect implementation of the SEC's consent decree, which had been entered in
another proceeding before another judge of the court. Additionally, the court believed that the
plaintiff's class was seeking a "free ride" in discovery. Id.
48. Id. at 622. In other words, protection of this information served essentially the same
interests that Upjohn identified as underlying the privilege. See 449 U.S. at 389.
49. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359-60 (D. Mass. 1950).
In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanski held that when an attorney-client "communication neither invite[s] nor express[es] any legal opinion whatsoever, but involve[s] the mere soliciting or giving of
business advice, it is not privileged." Id. "'Acting as a lawyer' encompasses the whole orbit of
legal functions. When he acts as an advisor, the attorney must give predominantly legal advice to
retain his client's privilege of non-disclosure, not solely, or even largely, business advice." Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954). See also Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 69 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Cal. 1975); 1983 A.B.A., supra note 6, at 41-45; Gergacz, supra note
11, at 1680-82.
50. United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359.
51. 343 F. Supp. 537 (D. Nev. 1972). Members of a law firm which represented two savings
and loan institutions moved into top management positions with these clients. Id. at 539-40. The
two attorneys subsequently resigned from that law firm and removed the files pertaining to the
two clients. Id. at 540. They proceeded to prosecute actions against the officers and directors of
the savings and loans, utilizing these files. Id. The former clients thereupon contended that the
attorney-client privilege and the conflict of interest supported a motion to suppress the files. Id. at
539.
52. Id.
548.
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ners and their communications were no longer privileged.53
SEC v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. is another case presenting
this same dilemma.5 The corporation had there claimed that the

SEC's proceeding against it was based, impermissibly, on information
disclosed to it in breach of the attorney-client privilege.5 5 The court

concluded that each instance cited by the corporation as a breach of
privilege involved an unprotected communication, either because the

attorney was not then acting in a legal capacity or because the information was not intended to be confidential."
As the court stated, the corporation "must conclusively prove each
element of the privilege."' 57 In order to meet this burden, the corpora-

tion must show that each allegedly privileged communication "'(1)

concerned the seeking of legal advice; (2) was between a client and an

attorney acting in his professional capacity; (3) was related to legal
matters; and (4) is at the client's instance permanently protected.' ,,5,
After the Gulf & Western decision, the moral is clear: clients should be

aware that business dealings with an attorney may divest their communications of the attorney-client privilege.
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith5" presents the legal ad-

vice/business advice dichotomy in a different setting. On first hearing
by the court of appeals, a majority of the panel sustained a disclosure
order of the district court on the theory that the law firm had not been
hired to provide legal services or advice.60 The court of appeals also

53. Id. at 546. "When the attorney and the client get in bed together as business partners,
their relationship is a business relationship, not a professional one, and their confidences are business confidences unprotected by a professional privilege." Id.
54. 518 F. Supp. 675 (D.D.C. 1981). For discussion of this case, see 46 ALB. L. REv. 1354
(1982).
55. 518 F. Supp. at 677. The corporation's former outside general counsel (Dolkart), who
had also served as a director and as a corporate secretary, had volunteered inculpatory information about the corporation to the SEC in order to avoid a jail sentence for his own defalcations. Id.
at 678.
56. Id. at 683. "Because of Dolkart's many roles and the large amount of time he spent at
Gulf & Western's offices, it cannot be assumed that all of his discussions with corporate officials
involved legal advice." Id.
57. Id. at 682.
58. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1980)). See
also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1963); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§ 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).

59. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on reh'g en banc, 572 F.2d 606 (1978). In
Diversified, an outside law firm had been employed to investigate the business practices of the
client following an SEC inquiry into the client's slush-fund activities. Id. at 600. The lawyers
carried out this charge by interviewing numerous employees, inspecting documents, and reporting
their findings and recommendations to the client's board of directors. Id. at 600-01. References to
the investigation, findings, and recommendations were included in the board minutes. Id. at 601.
The district court ordered production of the report and the minutes. Id. at 599.
60. Id. at 603.
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concluded that the firm had been hired to investigate facts and recom-

mend future business conduct and that this work did not require any
legal expertise.

1

The sole dissenter in the first hearing wrote the majority opinion
on rehearing en banc. 2 The new majority concluded that the communications were indeed privileged. This court's approach, in contrast to the
Gulf & Western approach,63 presumed that "'a matter committed to a
professional legal advisor is prima facie so committed for the sake of
legal advice . . . unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice."'" The court concluded that the presumption

protected the law firm's opinion."'
A special report by outside counsel was the subject of a discovery
attempt by stockholders in In re LTV Securities Litigation.6 6 The
stockholders had there sought discovery of the report on the theory that
the lawyers were acting as investigators, not lawyers,6 7 and that the

information gathered by them should not be privileged if it was needed
by corporate management for business purposes or if nonlawyers could
have performed the investigation just as well.66 The court rejected this
argument and stated that if the information is privileged, it does not
lose its privileged status merely because "management makes other
business use of the information"-as long as the information is handled

confidentially and was sought for the purpose of obtaining legal

61. It was employed solely for the purpose of making an investigation of facts and to
make recommendations with respect to the future conduct of Diversified in such areas as
the results of the investigation might suggest. The work that Law Firm was employed to
perform could have been performed just as readily by non-lawyers aided to the extent
necessary by a firm of public accountants.
Id.
62. Id. at 606.
63. The Gulf & W. court required a party claiming the privilege to "conclusively prove each
element of the privilege." 518 F. Supp. at 682.
64. 572 F.2d at 610 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2296).
65. 572 F.2d at 610.
66. 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Counsel had been employed by LTV to assist the
latter in responding to SEC subpoenas and to investigate the subject matter of the SEC inquiry-namely, the claimed overvaluation of inventories by LTV's subsidiary, Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co. Id. at 598-99. The lawyers negotiated a settlement with the SEC and defended LTV in
the ensuing stockholder litigation. Id. at 599-600.
67. The stockholders relied on Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 82 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ga.
1979) in their argument. 89 F.R.D. at 600. In Osterneck, the defendant corporation had hired a
special counsel in compliance with a consent and undertaking agreement with the SEC. 82 F.R.D.
at 83. The plaintiffs sought discovery of the special counsel's reports. The corporation and the
special counsel argued that the report was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. The court
held that the privilege did not attach to the special counsel's report because the special counsel
and his assistant "were employed not for their legal acumen but for their skill as investigators."
Id. at 85.
68. 89byF.R.D.
at 600-01.1983
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advice. 69
V.

WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE BY DISCLOSURE OF THE
COMMUNICATION

The attorney-client privilege indisputably belongs to the client"0
and consequently only the client can waive the privilege. 7 1 This section
explores the waiver issue in the corporate context, specifically in instances where courts have implied a waiver through the disclosure of a
communication.
A certain amount of disclosure is inevitable in the corporate setting. Most corporations are, after all, a great many people. As the
court in James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co. 7 2 noted, disclosure to those
with a reasonable need to know should not affect the privilege.73 In
Raytheon, the court concluded that files containing privileged information had not been so broadly circulated as to imply waiver, although
they were available to other employees who needed them."4 The possibility that unauthorized corporate personnel might "purposely or inadvertently" gain access to the files was not enough to destroy
78
confidentiality.
This is obviously a problem area, raising (as in the case of other
confidential data such as trade secrets) a nice conflict between the
practicalities of corporate operations and the nondisclosure principle.
Other corporate uses of privileged communications have been held to
undermine and defeat the privilege. In Eglin Federal Credit Union v.
Cantor, FitzgeraldSecurities Corp., 6 the court held board minutes of
69. Id. at 601. The court found Osterneck was distinguishable in that the attorneys in LTV
Sec. were "retained to develop legal positions for, and render legal advice to, LTV." Id.
70. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2321, at 629. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation
of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
71. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2327, at 634.
72. 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
73. Id. at 142. The communications were placed in corporate files where they were available
to other employees. Id.
It is of course true that the placement of the documents in the general program file made it
more likely that some corporate personnel other than those who "needed to know" would
discover their contents. But the fact that some unauthorized corporate personnel may purposely or inadvertently read a privileged document does not render that document nonconfidential. To hold otherwise would be to require every corporation to maintain at least two
sets of files. Moreover, a screening committee would then have to be set up whereby some
designated official could pass on the need of each employee to know the contents of any
requested document. Such a system is neither practical nor in the Court's opinion required
by case law.
Id. at 142.
74. Id. Cf. Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 448 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (no privilege
where document distributed to 12 persons).
75. 93 F.R.D. at 142.
76. 91 F.R.D. 414 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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a meeting with counsel privileged where it appeared that the corporation's accountants had been present to assist counsel in rendering legal
advice. However, the court found that the privilege had been waived
because the accountants routinely had access to all of the credit union's
minutes in connection with their annual audit.7
Attempts to preserve the privilege, notwithstanding disclosures
made under conditions of corporate stress, have met a mixed reception
in the courts. Typical of such cases are those involving voluntary disclosures to the SEC for various corporate purposes. The Eighth Circuit, in
its en banc opinion in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith' 8 announced the doctrine of "limited waiver" to protect from subsequent
disclosure privileged material previously surrendered to the SEC in
connection with a nonpublic investigation.79 The court adopted this limited-waiver doctrine because it did not want to discourage corporations
from seeking legal advice in aid of voluntary disclosure to the SEC;
Id. at 418-19.
Defendants have argued that these same documents were routinely made available to
the accountants for audit purposes. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that these minutes were edited or that some other precaution was taken to protect the confidential communications contained within these minutes before turning them over to the accountants
for audit purposes. The burden of persuasion rests on the party opposing discovery. Plaintiff
has in this instance failed to carry its burden.
Id. at 419 (citation omitted).
78. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on reh'g en banc, 572 F.2d 606 (1978).
79. Id. at 611. See also Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (defendant's voluntary disclosure of privileged material to SEC for the purpose of a nonpublic informal investigation did not waive privilege). But see In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (waiver where documents prepared by in-house counsel appeared to be in perpetration of a
fraud); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) (privilege waived where possible fraud
involved); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (waiver of privilege as
a result of disclosure of documents to SEC). Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock
Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), represents a middle ground in the cases
which discuss limited waiver. In Teachers, the court required an express reservation of the privilege at the time the disclosure of material was made to the government in order to preserve its
confidentiality. Id. at 646. The commentators have been critical of Diversified. As one pointed out,
the court
failed to consider disclosure to the SEC in terms of whether it met the privilege's traditional secrecy requirement . . . . [Tihe disclosures were made voluntarily, without any
attempt to ensure confidentiality. Such a naked disclosure evidences a lack of interest in
retaining the privilege and is thus inconsistent with the rationale for relaxing the standard
in other contexts.
50 FORDHAM L. REv. 963, 982-83 (1982) (footnotes omitted). "The Eighth Circuit created the
limited waiver to achieve a worthy objective, but the innovation is theoretically incompatible with
the attorney-client privilege and therefore capable of profound mischief." 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
812, 823-24 (1982). It "enables corporations to disclose privileged information selectively and
selfishly." Id. at 825. For other works discussing this issue, see 1983 A.B.A., supra note 6, at
55-57; Gergacz, supra note 11, at 1666-75; Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the AttorneyClient Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary System. and the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HAsTINGs L.J. 495, 522-25
(1982).
77.
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"[tjo hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing
procedure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential
stockholders and customers.""0
Other courts, however, have rejected the limited-waiver theory,
particularly in cases where the disclosure to the enforcement agency
was motivated less by a desire to bare the corporate breast than by an
effort to gain some advantage. For example, in Permian Corp. v.
United States,8' Occidental Petroleum tried to keep the SEC from
turning over privileged documents to the Department of Energy. 82 Occidental had furnished the documents to the SEC in an effort to expedite approval of a registration statement which it had filed in connection with a takeover attempt. 88 The disclosure to the SEC was limited

by an SEC stipulation of confidentiality.84

The D.C. Circuit found this qualified disclosure to be an impermissible "tactical employment" of the privilege: using the communication where thought to be helpful, concealing it where not. 85 In this

court's view, the client must consistently assert the privilege for attorney-client communications to remain confidential. 86 The D.C. Circuit
specifically rejected the Eighth Circuit's reasoning that a corporation
would be less likely to seek assistance and advice from independent

outside counsel without the limited-waiver doctrine.8 7

80. 472 F.2d at 611.
81. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For discussion of this case, see 50 FORDHAM L. REV.
963, 984-85 (1982); 50 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 812, 820-22 (1982); 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 223 (1982).
82. 665 F.2d at 1217.
83. Id. at 1216.
84. Id. at 1217-18. The Teachers court stated that a disclosure is not a waiver if it is
"made pursuant to a stipulation reserving the right to assert the privilege ...." 521 F. Supp. at
641 (citation omitted). See also IBM Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 980 (1974); 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 985-87.
85. 665 F.2d at 1221.
86. Id.
The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others, or to invoke
the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he has already compromised for
his own benefit. In the present case, Occidental has been willing to sacrifice confidentiality
in order to expedite approval of the exchange offer, and now asserts that the secrecy of the
attorney-client relationship precludes disclosure of the same documents in other administrative litigation. The attorney-client privilege is not designed for such tactical
employment.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 1220-21 & n.13. "Unlike the Eighth Circuit, we cannot see how 'the developing
procedure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them'
would be thwarted by telling a corporation that it cannot disclose the resulting reports to the SEC
if it wishes to maintain their confidentiality." Id.
Voluntary cooperation with government investigations may be a laudable activity, but it is
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Another case rejecting the limited-waiver doctrine is In re John

Doe Corp." The corporation here had shown a privileged report to its
accountants in order to dissuade them from qualifying their audit opinion. The corporation had also revealed the report to an underwriter's
lawyer, who was conducting a due-diligence inquiry in connection with
a public offering of the corporation's stock." A certain transaction,
thought to have been an intended bribe, had been described in earlier
drafts but omitted from the report shown the accountants and under-

writers. 90 This the court considered to be an affirmative representation
by the corporation to third parties of the propriety of the questioned
transaction, and hence fatal to the claim of privilege. 91 The communications to the accountants and underwriters were not protected because

the corporation had not revealed the report for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice.9 The court declared that "[o]nce a corporate decision is
made to disclose [the privileged communication] for commercial purposes, no matter what the economic imperatives, the privilege is lost,

not because of voluntariness or involuntariness, but because the need
for confidentiality served by the privilege is inconsistent with such
disclosure.""

A similar misuse of privileged documents likewise resulted in a
loss of privilege in In re Sealed Case." In this case, outside counsel
was employed at the suggestion of the SEC to look into questionable

hard to understand how such conduct improves the attorney-client relationship. If the client
feels the need to keep his communications with his attorney confidential, he is free to do so
under the traditional rule by consistently asserting the privilege, even when the discovery
request comes from a "friendly" agency.
Id. at 1221.
88. 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982). The corporation challenged a grand jury subpoena
calling for drafts and other documents relating to business ethics reviews its counsel had prepared.
Id. at 484. The corporation involved was Southland, later indicted on charges of conspiring to
bribe New York tax officials in return for a favorable settlement of a tax dispute. 15 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 1019 (1983).
89. 675 F.2d at 485.
90. Id. at 488, 489.
91. Id. at 489.
92. Id.
93. Id. (footnote omitted). In a curious subsequent development, an SEC official, who as a
private attorney had represented the corporation in connection with its self-investigation, himself
became the subject, but not the target, of a grand jury inquiry. Previously, upon the instructions
of the corporation, he had claimed attorney-client privilege and refused to testify before a committee of the House of Representatives. Later, he reportedly stated that the corporation had made a
"limited" waiver of the privilege to permit him to be interviewed by federal officials and to testify
before the grand jury and the SEC staff. And, as the subject of a grand jury inquiry, he was freed
from the client's right to assert the privilege and was prepared to testify before any interested
congressional committee and to answer any questions put to him by individual members. 15 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1019-20.
94. 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

Published by eCommons, 1983

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:3

payments made in foreign countries." The special counsel's report,
based upon interviews with corporate employees and an examination of
documents, was delivered to the SEC and others.' 6 The SEC settled its
action against the corporation by consent decree. A grand jury was
thereafter convened to consider indictment of the corporation and
others for obstruction of justice and other crimes." The jury subpoenaed in-house counsel to testify and to produce documents in his possession. 98 In opposition to the corporation's claim of privilege, the government adduced evidence that the corporation had not revealed all of

the relevant facts to its special counsel." The court held that disclosure
of the special report to the SEC impliedly waived the corporation's
claim of privilege for whatever documents were necessary for a fair
evaluation of the report. Documents impeaching the veracity of the report could not be withheld. 100 The court reasoned that by participating

in the SEC's voluntary disclosure program, a company "forgoes some
of the traditional protections of the adversary system in order to avoid

some of the traditional burdens that accompany adversary resolution of
disputes ....
"101 Furthermore, the program was not meant to allow
the selective disclosure of only favorable information.10 2 On the con-

trary, the program was designed "to seek the truth."'0 3
The result in that case presents an interesting contrast to

95.
96.

Id. at 801.
Id. at 801-02.

97. Id. at 803. The SEC had reported this case to the Department of Justice for investigation of criminal violations. Id.
98. Id. at 803-04. The in-house counsel and the corporation moved to quash the subpoena
for the 38 documents on the grounds of attorney-client privilege and work product. Id. at 804.
After the district court inspected the documents in camera, it granted the motion to quash on all
but eight portions of the documents. Id. The corporation appealed and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the grounds that such a denial was not appealable until someone is held in
contempt for refusing to produce the documents. Id. at 804-05. When a new grand jury was
convened, it subpoenaed these same documents again, the corporation's new attorney refused to
produce the documents, and the district court held him in contempt. Id. at 805.
99. Id. at 822. The company had withheld certain documents that revealed "a different,
highly embarrassing, version of events." Id. The court stated that "[ijf we were to allow corporations to use the work product privilege to accomplish such a sleight-of-hand, it would severely
limit the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure programs." Id. Although the court is discussing the
work-product doctrine here, the same principles apply to the attorney-client privilege.
100. Id. at 824. "When Company submitted its investigative counsel's report and notes to
the SEC and otherwise complied with the ground rules of the voluntary disclosure program it
bound itself to provide the SEC access to any documentation necessary to evaluate the report." Id.
101. Id. at 822-23.
102. Id. at 824. "When a corporation elects to participate in a voluntary disclosure program
like the SEC's, it necessarily decides that the benefits of participation outweigh the benefits of
confidentiality for all files necessary to a full evaluation of its disclosures." Id. at 822.
103. Id. at 825.
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Upjohn.1 " In Upjohn, the corporation had filed reports about its questionable payments with the SEC and IRS. 10 5 Nevertheless, these reports were held not to have opened up for discovery the responses of its
managers to the general counsel's questionnaire.10 6 It is difficult to distinguish these cases on the ground that the responses to Upjohn's questionnaire fell outside the limited disclosure of facts contained in its report, since by implication Upjohn also represented that there were no
other facts known to it requiring such disclosure. Perhaps the difference
is that in Upjohn, unlike Sealed Case, there was no suggestion that the
company's report had deliberately misrepresented the facts. The opinion of the D.C. Circuit in Sealed Case is clear, however: If a report is
filed with a governmental agency, the corporation has impliedly waived
the privilege as to all documents necessary to test the report's
10 7
veracity.

VI.

THE CRIME OR FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE

There is nothing novel in the doctrine that communications made
in furtherance of an ongoing crime or fraud are not protected by the
attorney-client privilege.'
Even if the attorney is unaware that the
client is seeking his or her advice to further an improper purpose, the
crime or fraud exception still applies. 10 9 The more interesting question
is the necessary showing of criminality required to strip away the
privilege.
This question is commonly presented on a motion to quash a grand
jury subpoena. The resolution of the issue is complicated by the fact
that clients "cannot make factual arguments about materials they have
not seen" because of the confidentiality attaching to grand jury evidence. 1 0 The Second Circuit in the recent case of In re John Doe
Corp. approved the in camera submission to the district court of evidence of corporate wrongdoing."' The court held that nondisclosure of

104. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
105. Id. at 387.
106. Id. at 394-95. The magistrate who first heard the case thought that the report to the
SEC had waived the corporation's privilege. Id. at 388. Thus, while the issue of the corporation's
waiver of the privilege was in the record, the Supreme Court seems to have skirted the issue.
107. Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 824.
108. See 1983 A.B.A., supra note 6, at 59; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, §
503(d)(1)[01]; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2298; Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A. J. 708 (1961); Gergacz, supra note 11, at 1676.
109. United States v. Hedge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977); cf. In re
Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812-13 & n.75 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussion of the application of the
crime or fraud exception to the work-product doctrine).
110. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 490 (2d Cir. 1982).
111. Id.
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the government's evidence to the corporation was justified on the facts
of that case. After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that
there was "probable cause" to believe that the communications claimed
to be privileged were part of a scheme of ongoing criminality sufficient
to overcome the claim of privilege."'
The court perceptively noted the dilemma of corporate counsel
who are confronted by evidence of client wrongdoing. Serious commercial or even personal consequences for clients may follow upon disclosure of such wrongdoing. The lawyers themselves may be "torn between
a desire to see the firm prosper and their professional and legal obligations."' 1 3 If this be the case, the court recommended hiring outside
counsel to conduct such investigations. 14
This is not to say that corporate counsel must report "to the FBI
upon the first sign of criminality" in a privileged communication. 5
Communications are, however, protected only insofar as they involve
the rendering of legal advice:1
Use of the fact of an investigation to allay the concerns of third parties
about possible criminal acts, to create the appearance of compliance with
laws requiring disclosure, or to cover up a crime disclosed through a protected communication in the course of the investigation will cause the
corporation to lose the privilege. 7
A similar procedure was approved by the court in In re Sealed
Case." 8 The D.C. Circuit stated that the test for stripping the privilege
from attorney-client communications in the context of a grand jury
subpoena had to be simple enough to be swiftly applied without adversarial presentation of the issues, since one party would not be privy to
the information at issue.11 9 The test was in two steps: first, a prima
1 20
facie showing of a violation of law sufficient to defeat the privilege;
and second, proof of a valid relationship between the document in ques-

112. Id. at 491. The court took pains to state that it was not passing on the ultimate question, but only that there was before it "direct evidence, not implausible on its face, specifically
supporting a conclusion as to probable cause." Id. at 491 n.7.
113. Id. at 491.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 491-92.
117. Id. at 492.
118. 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
119. Id. at 814.
120. Id. Although the test was applied to the work-product privilege, the court noted that
"lain exception or waiver of the work product privilege will also serve as an exception or waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, since the coverage and purposes of the attorney-client privilege are
completely subsumed into the work product privilege." Id. at 812.
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tion and the primafacie violation. 2 For the first step, the government
need show only that the crime or fraud was ongoing or about to be
committed when the communication occurred. For the second step, a
22
reasonable relationship should suffice.
The burden of proof for removing the privilege in patent infringement cases is sometimes said to be much higher than in other fraud
cases.' 23 That would seem to reflect the fact that the doctrine known as
"fraud on the patent office" need not involve common-law fraud at all,
but merely inequitable conduct. In such cases, in order to compel disclosure, it is not enough to show that the patent applicant and the applicant's attorney failed to exercise the highest degree of candor and
12 4
good faith in their dealings with the Patent and Trademark Office.
Proof of fraud, as in other cases, is necessary to vitiate the privilege-a
proof more substantial than the proof needed to prevent enforcement of
the patent. Inequitable conduct is not enough. "[S]erious unlawful activity" must be shown,12 5 which, in the case of fraud, must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence. 2 The attorney-client privilege may
wither in the face of a prima facie showing of crime, as in the grand
jury cases noted above, but it is not so fragile as to vanish merely be27
cause "fraud" is charged and inequity is suggested by the facts.'
In summary, the cases suggest that a "probable cause" showing of
crime or fraud is necessary to defeat a claim of privilege. There is no
"bright-line" test; on the contrary, the courts have approached the

121. Id. at 814-15. According to one commentator, this standard "suggests a balancing
between the gravity of the alleged misconduct and the important policies which the privilege seeks
to protect." Gergacz, supra note I1,at 1676-77.
122. 676 F.2d at 815. The court observed that "[tihe exact formulation of a 'test' for relatedness is less important than an understanding of what the test must accomplish: easy differentiation between material for which the law should not furnish the protection of a privilege and material for which a privilege should be protected." Id. at 815 n.9 1. See also Gergacz, supra note 11,
at 1677-78.
123. See Research Corp. v. Gourmet's Delight Mushroom Co., 560 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
124. Id. at 819-20; Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949). However, the breach of
the duty of candor and good faith may result in unenforceability of the patent. See Gourmet, 560
F. Supp. at 820; American Optical Corp. v. United States, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682, 684 (Ct. Cl.
1973); 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (1983).
125. 560 F. Supp. at 820; see American Optical, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 684.
126. 560 F. Supp. at 820; see DeLong Corp. v. Raymond Int'l Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 1145
(3d Cir. 1980).
127. [I]n order to pierce the privilege it is not enough to show merely inequitable conduct before the Patent Office. Rather, it is necessary to establish a case of fraudulent procurement; i.e., one must show (1) a knowing, willful and intentional act of misrepresentation or omission before the Patent Office; (2) the misrepresentation or omission must be
material; and (3) the Patent Office must have relied upon the misrepresentation or
omission.
American Optical, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 684.
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problem on a case by case basis with competing policies guiding their
decisions.' The underlying principle seems to be that the privilege will
29
be lost if abused.1
VII.

THE RULE THAT ONLY COMMUNICATIONS WITH A MEMBER OF
THE BAR ARE PROTECTED

The attorney-client privilege requires that one of the communicants actually be an attorney-at-law, preferably but not necessarily li-

censed to practice in the jurisdiction in which the communication was
made.'3 0 However, some authorities have argued that a mere reasonable belief on the client's part that he or she was talking with an attorney ought to insulate the communication from compelled disclosure.' 3 '
In Dabney v. Investment Corp. of America,- 2 the court recognized
that a genuine mistake on the part of the client that the attorney was a
member of the bar would be sufficient to invoke the privilege. 33 However, under the facts of that case, the privilege did not attach to the
claimed communication because the president of the corporation knew
that the "attorney" was not licensed to practice law.' 3 4 The corporation

128. See Gergacz, supra note 11, at 1678.
129. Id. This commentator suggests that since the privilege belongs to the corporation and
the corporation is merely a legal fiction,
[o]ne might argue that corporate employees who communicate with counsel to cover up
wrongdoing attributed to the corporation, but actually committed by other individuals, are
not communicating within the scope of their corporate duties as required by the Upjohn
standards. The privilege may not even be created since non-law abiding activities are not
associated with corporate employee duties.
Id. at 1679.
130. See. e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del.
1954) (membership in the bar of the state where services rendered not an absolute requirement).
See also 1983 A.B.A., supra note 6, at 22-24; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2300.
13 I. Only recently, here in Dayton, it was disclosed that a man practicing before our courts
had never been admitted to any bar. His clients had been impressed by his office and his demeanor, if not by his ability, and he seems to have been no less successful than many of his
licensed colleagues. See Dayton Daily News, Jan. 19, 1983, at 24, col. 1. It seems harsh to hold
that all of his clients' communications with him, seeking and obtaining legal advice, are
discoverable.
Wigmore stated that "[tlhe theory of the privilege clearly requires that the client's bona fide
belief in the status of his advisor as an admitted attorney should entitle him to the privilege." 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2302 (citation omitted). Proposed FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(2) incorporated this view: "A 'lawyer' is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be
authorized, to practice law in any state or nation." 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972) (emphasis added).
See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, 1 503(a)(2)[01]; McLaughlin, The Treatment of Attorney-Client and Related Privilege in the Proposed Rules of Evidencefor the United
States District Courts, 26 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 30, 32 (1971).
132. 82 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
133. Id. at 465.
134. Id. An attorney for the corporation was deposed to testify as to events which occurred
before he had graduated from law school and been admitted to the bar. Counsel for the corporation objected to such testimony on the basis of attorney-client privilege. Id.
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had attempted to argue that the "attorney" was "in the same position
as a new and not-yet-licensed associate in a law firm" and-since he
performed legal duties, was thought of as an attorney by others in the

corporation, and "made privy to certain confidential information that
would have been disclosed only to an attorney"-the privilege should

apply to communications with him. 8 5 The court rejected these arguments and granted the motion to compel discovery. 3 6
It is a reasonable extension of the attorney-client privilege to ex-

tend protection to communications with individuals the client reasonably believes to be licensed attorneys. The reason for the extension will
not, however, support the grant of privilege to persons, however qualified otherwise, who the client knows are not licensed practitioners. In a
recent case, a vice president in charge of litigation and regulatory com-

pliance who had graduated from law school but had not been admitted
to any bar was asked on deposition about an internal investigation he
had conducted. 3 7 Counsel defending the deposition asserted the attor-

ney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine to withhold the results of the investigation from discovery. 3 8 The witness further complicated the case by testifying falsely that he was a member of the bar of
another state. 3 9 When his lack of professional status was disclosed, the

claim of privilege disappeared and the court reportedly fined the witness and his employer for contempt of court. 4 0

135. Id. The corporation also argued that the law student's prior work experience should be
a factor in deciding whether the privilege should attach. Id. at 466.
136. Id. "To hold otherwise would poorly serve the purpose of the privilege, which is to
promote the freedom of consultation that is essential to full and effective legal representation. It is
clear, therefore, that admission to the bar is not the superfluous formality that defendant says it
is." Id. (citations omitted). The court noted the dangerous consequences which might result were
they to extend the privilege to such communications:
To extend the attorney-client privilege to communications made to a law student unsupervised by a duly qualified lawyer would, to some extent, encourage the public to entrust its legal concerns and seek legal advice from persons as yet unqualified to engage in
the practice of law. It would, to that extent, undermine the power of the state to regulate
this most sensitive of professions, whose members are viewed, in the Preamble to the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility, as "guardians of the law, playing a vital role
in the preservation of society." It would permit the claiming of the privilege not simply
where one party to a conversation is an attorney whose professional advice is sought, but in
virtually any situation where legal confidences are exchanged. It would unnecessarily blur
the dividing line between qualified and unqualified attorneys, to the certain dismay of the
lay public and the ultimate detriment of the legal profession.
Id.
137. Nat'l L.J., Apr. 11, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The attorney-client privilege exists in the European Economic
Community (EEC), but under different names14 1 and different rules
than those familiar to American lawyers. As in the United States, the
picture there is by no means clear. American lawyers with European
contacts should be aware of the significant differences in the European
privilege, however.
The recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in A M & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European
Communities42 provides some guidance in this area. A M & S had
offered to show EEC investigators portions of purportedly privileged
documents in order to avoid disclosure of the entire documents.' 3 The
commission insisted that it had the sole right to determine whether the
documents were entitled to privilege by reading them. 144 The commission rejected attempts by the company to reach a compromise on a
means short of disclosure for making that determination.' 4

141. For example, the privilege is called the "legal professional privilege" in England and
Ireland, while it is merely called "confidentiality" in Scotland. A M & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep....
[1982] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9063.
142. Id. at -, [1982] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757. The case arose out of an EEC
investigation of the zinc industry, begun in 1978. Id. at -, [1982] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1
8757, at 9039. A M & S, an English company and a member of the Australian Rio Tinto group,
refused to produce a number of documents, including opinions by counsel and exchanges of letters
by executives, on the ground of "legal professional privilege," the misnomer used in England to
denote the client's right to keep communications with the attorney confidential. Id. at -,
[1982]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9062, 9065. For commentary on the case, see Duffy,
Legal Privilege and Community Law, 132 NEw L.J. 580 (1982); 7 EUR. L. REV. 308 (1982);
1982 J. Bus. L. 263; 1982 J. Bus. L. 398; 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 451 (1982); 131 NEW L.J. 102
(1981).
143. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1982] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ? 8757, at
9040.
144. id.
145. Id. Initially, the inspectors stopped the investigation with respect to the privileged documents. However, they reserved the right to inspect them at a later time. At a September 1979
meeting in Brussels, the commission decided it had the right to inspect all of the documents. The
company then filed its action in the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Id. The British Government intervened on the side of the company. Id. at -,
[19821 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) $ 8757, at 9050. The French Government intervened on the side of the commission arguing that the English were trying to foist their own provincial doctrine on the continental members

of the Common Market. Id. at

__,

[1982]

COMMON MKT. REP.

(CCH)

8757, at 9051. The

Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Communities filed a
scholarly study of the variety of laws and practices found in the jurisprudences of the member
countries on the subject of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at -,
[1982] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH)
8757, at 9063. In addition, Advocate General J.-P. Warner, an independent official
charged with the duty of assisting the court, delivered his opinion in January 1981 generally
sustaining the privilege. Id. at -, [1982] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) V 8757, at 9062-77 (opin-
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Subsequently, A M & S filed suit in the Court of Justice. After
the first hearing, the court ordered the company to submit the withheld
documents to the court under seal. 1" 6 In an order of January 21, 1981,
the court reopened the oral procedure because the composition of the
court had changed. The second hearing held in October 1981 addressed
"the existence and extent of the protection granted-in investigative
proceedings instituted by the public authorities for the purpose of detecting offenses of an economic nature, especially in the field of competition-to correspondence passing between: 1. Two lawyers; 2. An independent lawyer and his client; [3. An in-house lawyer and his
employer; 4. A legal advisor of a company and an employee of that
company or an associated company; and 5. Employees of the same or
associated companies, referring to legal advice.]" 1 4
After reviewing the varieties of the privilege recognized in the
member countries of the EEC, the court cut its own pattern. At the
outset, it noted that article 14 of regulation 17, which spells out the
enforcement procedures for the antitrust articles of the EEC treaty,
authorized the EEC Commission to require production of business
records.'48 This included lawyers' letters regarding compliance with the
rules governing competition.' 49 The court reasoned that since the commission may require the production of any documents it considers "necessary" to its investigation, the commission may then in principle decide which documents must be produced. 50
However, the court did not preclude the possibility that certain of
these business records may be confidential. To determine the scope of
this confidentiality, the court looked to "principles and concepts common to the laws" of the Community states. 5 ' The court found that
these laws comm6nly recognized the "confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client" as long as the communications
concern the "client's rights of defense" and the lawyers are not inhouse counsel. 152

ion of Advocate General J.-P. Warner). In January 1982 another advocate general, Sir Gordon
[1982] COMMON
Slynn, delivered his opinion, also generally sustaining the privilege. Id. at -,
MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9077-90 (opinion of Advocate General G. Slynn).
[19821 COMMON MKT.REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9055. The court notified all
146. Id. at -,
parties of the nature of the contents. Id.

147. Id. at
148. Id. at
149. Id. at

-,
-,
-,

[19821
[19821
[1982]

COMMON MKT. REP.
COMMON MKT. REP.
COMMON MKT. REP.

(CCH) $ 8757, at 9056.
(CCH) V 8757, at 9058-59.
(CCH) 8757, at 9059.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. The protection extends to written communications exchanged after the initiation of
an administrative procedure under regulation 17, as well as to "earlier written communications
[1982] COMMON
which have a relationship to the subject matter of that procedure." Id. at -,
MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9059-60. An important principle the court found to be recognized
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The protection was limited to communications with independent
lawyers for a number of reasons. First, the court cited the collaborative
role such lawyers play in the administration of justice by the courts.
Another reason given by the court was that these attorneys are required to provide in full independence such legal assistance as the client needs. Furthermore, independent lawyers are subject to rules of
professional ethics and discipline enforced by appropriate
1 53
institutions.
The court expressed concern that in-house counsel would abuse the
privilege because they are not subject to the rules and regulations of
the profession. 54 Finally, only lawyers entitled to practice in a member
country come within this protected class, by reason of what seems to be
a non-sequitur: namely, the regulations on the free exercise of the legal

in all of the states was that "any person must be able, without constraint, to consult a lawyer
whose profession entails the giving of legal advice to all those in need of it." Id. at -,
[1982]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9059. If this be the case, it is hard to discern why the
court only extended protection to independent lawyers. Surely, an in-house counsel's "profession
entails the giving of legal advice." For material criticizing this distinction, see Duffy, supra note
142, at 582; 7 EUR. L. REV. at 313-14; 1982 J. Bus. L. at 263-64; 1982 J. Bus. L. at 399-400;

16 J. WORLD TRADE L. at 453-54.
153. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at
9060.

-,

[1982]

COMMON MKT. REP.

(CCH) 1 8757, at

154. Id. The rationale put forth by the court has been subjected to much criticism. As one
commentator noted, this distinction will create "an unnecessary and expensive procedure for all
Community matters to be dealt with by outside lawyers, with little practical advantage to anyone." 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. at 454. See also 1982 J. Bus. L. at 263-64. As Lord Denning
stated with respect to in-house lawyers,

They are regarded by the law as in every respect in the same position as those who practise
on their own account. The only difference is that they act for one client only, and not for

several clients. They must uphold the same standards of honour and of etiquette. They are
subject to the same duties to their client and to the court. They must respect the same
confidences. They and their clients have the same privileges.
Alfred Cropton Amusement Mach. Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Comm'n (No. 2), [1972] 2 Q.B.
102, 129 (C.A.).
Another criticism of this distinction concerning in-house counsel is the fact that the issue was
not seriously argued by the parties. 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. at 453. The arguments primarily
addressed procedure. Id. at 453-54. Procedurally, the court embraced the idea that the company
must show the commission enough for it to determine whether a document is privileged, without
disclosing the contents. If the commission does not accept the company's position, it may order
production of the document, under penalty. The company may then appeal to the Court of Justice

and seek interim relief against the penalty. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1982] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8757, at 9060-61. The procedure prescribed does not seem calculated to
arrive at a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of the question presented, and would appear to

be available only to wealthy and determined respondents. Articles 185 and 186 of the EEC treaty
and article 83 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice provide that a company may
obtain an order from the court suspending application of the EEC decision. Id. at -, [1982]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8757, at 9061. The court also ruled, in substance, that the privilege
belongs to the client, and not to his or her lawyer, by stating that the client may disclose the
communication if the client considers that it is in his or her interest to do so. Id. at -, [1982]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9060.
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profession throughout the Community. 5 5
American lawyers advising clients with business operations abroad

are cautioned, therefore, not to expect confidential treatment of their
communications with their clients' offices in the European Economic
Community. There is, of course, no greater folly than the unquestioned
assumption that rules of conduct appropriate to practice in one jurisdiction are equally appropriate elsewhere. Failure to attend to national
differences in the respect accorded the attorney-client privilege may result in damning the client upon evidence supplied by the attorney. One
may imagine in such a case that the attorney's embarrassment would
be exceeded only by the client's outrage.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The attorney-client privilege, both abroad and domestically, is not
free from doubts or complexities. In Europe, the A M & S decision has
left in-house corporate attorneys without protection for their communications with clients. Unfortunately for American lawyers, the A M & S
court has also denied protection to their communications with clients in
Europe unless the attorney is licensed to practice in an EEC member
country. The American rule, by contrast, requires only that the attorney be a licensed member of the profession, or reasonably believed by
the client to be so. Both rules recognize the social utility of the privilege. However, the EEC rule emphasizes the prevention of abuse of the
privilege while the American rule concentrates on encouraging disclosure by the client.
Upjohn restored a broad conception of the role of the privilege
protecting communications between attorneys and their corporate clients, but left it to the lower courts to determine the applicability of the
privilege on a case by case basis. In some areas, such as the crime or
fraud exception to the privilege, Upjohn has produced no changes in
the law. In other areas, the purpose and function of the privilege, as
articulated in Upjohn, seem to have animated recent judicial consideration of cases involving waiver and the claim of "limited waiver," as well
as the applicability of the privilege to parties with common and not so
common interests. One problem that the Upjohn Court did not resolve
was the extent of protection afforded communications with former employees. It remains to be seen how the courts will resolve such questions. In the interim, counsel attempting to advise corporate clients
with respect to compliance with the antitrust laws and other similarly
complex federal regulation will be well advised to mark off the bounda-

155.
9060.

1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -,
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ries of the privilege at the outset and to exercise care not to stray beyond those limits. Fortunately for lawyer and client alike, this will require continuing close consultation between them.
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